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Abstract: In this paper, I defend the view that the requested eutha-
nasia of adults is morally permissible and should be legalised; I use 
an argument from analogy which compares physician-assisted eutha-
nasia with morally less ambiguous and, in my opinion, an acceptable 
instance of mercy killing. I also respond to several objections that 
either try to prove that the instance of mercy killing is not accepta-
ble, or that there is a fundamental difference between these two cases 
of killing. Furthermore, in the remainder of the paper I defend the 
moral permissibility and legalisation of euthanasia against several ob-
jections that appeared in local disputes on this issue, based on the 
concepts of the limits of freedom, the slippery slope, and the need-
lessness of euthanasia. 
Keywords: Legalisation; moral freedom; morality; needlessness of eu-
thanasia; requested euthanasia; sanctity; slippery slope. 
 There are two types of death: we either die at a time and in a manner 
we do not choose or at a time and in a manner which we do. We can state 
that most people who have died did not depart at the time or in the manner 
they would have chosen, as they died either earlier or in a different way 
than they wanted to. We can assume that, if given the chance, those who 
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died from illnesses, injuries, advanced age, unfortunate accidents, or by be-
ing killed would have preferred to go at a later time as well as in a different 
and less unpleasant way. In light of this idea, it seems preferable to meet 
death on our own terms. If medicine and technology have made this possi-
ble, we should probably want to allow people to be in charge of the circum-
stances of their own death. 
 This opinion does not invite controversy when talking about people who 
wish to live longer, but it becomes controversial once we start discussing 
those who want to shorten their lives. Granting a longer life to people who 
desire it does not appear to be an issue, so why does it become one once we 
start contemplating the rightness of hastening the death of those who re-
quest it? 
 Some opine that we would commit a serious mistake by bringing death 
to those who ask for it, arguing that obeying such a wish is unreasonable. 
While some claim that wishing to die is unreasonable because every life is 
worth living, others claim that it is impossible to rationally conclude that 
our life has ceased to be worth living. Critics of euthanasia thus suggest 
that rather than complying with a patient’s wish to die, we should strive to 
improve their life. 
 These objections are as important as they are philosophically interest-
ing, and a decent defence of euthanasia should be able to respond to them. 
Although I share the opinion that we should primarily endeavour to im-
prove the lives of those wishing to die and that a person can sometimes err 
in thinking their life has ceased to be worth living, I also maintain that in 
certain circumstances a person’s life might become not worth living and 
that they can rationally arrive at such a conclusion. However, I defended 
these opinions elsewhere and therefore will simply assume their truth in this 
paper (see Greif 2018). If they were not assumed true, there would be little 
need to respond to the second type of objections that question the morality 
of ending another person’s life prematurely, i.e., euthanasia. 
 Euthanasia poses an ethical dilemma. On one hand, there are people 
who do not consider their lives worth living and express an honest wish to 
die. I assume we want to empathise with their suffering and show respect 
for their decision to end their life. On the other hand, a moral doubt remains 
lingering: “Is it right to end someone’s life on their request? Would we not 
The Morality of Euthanasia 3 
Organon F 2019: 1–23 
be committing murder or another serious offence?” And we surely do not 
want to err in such a serious matter. How can it be resolved then? 
 I think there is a solution to this problem. To demonstrate it, I will first 
present an argument in favour of requested euthanasia being morally un-
problematic and permissible.1 I will support the argument by responding to 
several objections to its premises. Then I will focus on three objections that 
appeared in a debate in the Czech journal Filosofický časopis in 2010 
through 2012. I will try to prove that all these objections can be countered. 
My defence only focuses on the requested (or voluntary) euthanasia of 
adults, which I define as “an act when an adult person kills another adult 
person for the latter’s well-being and on the latter’s request.”2 My main 
objective is to defend the thesis that “the requested euthanasia of adults is 
morally permissible.” 
 Before commencing my defence of euthanasia, I would like to comment 
on the nature of my defence. Ethics is a delicate discipline, and ethical 
questions are notoriously difficult to resolve in a way that everyone would 
find satisfactory. As a consequence, a certain tension characterises my de-
fence, which I would prefer to disclose at the very beginning. I understand 
ethics as a kind of rational and secular debate. Therefore, “ethics” deferring 
to a religious authority or an authority of individuals who claim to possess 
special moral knowledge is not what I consider to be ethics. I find it crucial 
that in ethics, whenever possible and necessary, moral assertions should be 
justified without referring to personal or divine authority. On the other 
hand, justifying every statement is neither necessary nor possible. Some key 
statements I cannot or will not justify, hoping that they do not require 
justification. I am referring to statements that philosophy would call “moral 
intuitions.” My judgement about the trapped lorry driver case, which I will 
present shortly, provides a rather illustrative example of moral intuition. 
                                                 
1  I use the expressions “morally unproblematic,” “permissible,” “permitted,” 
“right,” and “moral” interchangeably. Correspondingly, “morally prohibited,” “not 
morally permissible,” “wrong,” and “immoral” are also interchangeable. 
2  I base this definition on the etymology of the word “euthanasia”—εὐθανασία 
(euthanasía), from εὐ- (eu, “well” or “good”) + θάνατος (thanatos; “death”)—that 
is, good death. Since I want to differentiate euthanasia from suicide, I define it as 
good death caused by another person. 
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This judgement plays a crucial role in my defence of euthanasia which 
would not work without it. It is, however, unjustified, and I do not know 
with certainty if the reasonable majority would accept it. Taking into con-
sideration how much disagreement moral questions tend to generate, it is 
possible that even what I consider utterly evident might invite harsh criti-
cism. Although I do not know if the reasonable majority would agree with 
me, I will assume it does. Naturally, in cases like this claims can be made 
that mostly suit the author’s interests instead of reflecting the reasonable 
majority’s opinion; however, this risk is present in every ethical debate and 
should be accepted by its participants. If we are to arrive at some kind of 
a resolution, we, the disputing sides, have to establish an initial agreement, 
even if only by guessing. 
* * * 
 Let us advance to the argument put forth in favour of the morality of 
euthanasia. It is based on the famous “trapped lorry driver case,” in which 
a man is killed in a way that I consider permissible and that shares every 
essential feature with physician-assisted requested euthanasia. 
The trapped lorry driver case 
A driver is trapped in a blazing lorry. There is no way in which 
he can be saved. He will soon burn to death. A friend of the 
driver is standing by the lorry. This friend has a gun and is a 
good shot. The driver asks this friend to shoot him dead. It will 
be less painful for him to be shot than to burn to death. Should 
the friend shoot the driver dead? (Hope et al. 2008, 185) 
 Premise 1: I can only speak for myself with certainty, but I cannot think 
of any moral reason why the friend should not comply with the driver’s 
request. Therefore, I believe that the friend should shoot the driver dead. 
However, before killing the driver, I would have to verify that he truly 
cannot be helped and that he would suffer tremendously if I did not shoot 
him. But if I was certain that his situation really was awful and desperate, 
I hope I could muster enough courage and presence of mind to shoot him 
dead. I would consider it the right thing to do. 
 In my opinion, emotions tend to get tangled up with morals when dis-
cussing euthanasia, which in turn might cloud our judgement. I am sure 
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that shooting the driver dead would not make me happy. I would wish that 
I did not have to do it and that the lorry driver could live. Because of these 
feelings of unhappiness and tragedy, I might be tempted to think that I did 
something wrong. But my reason would clearly tell me that it is not so, as 
the only possible alternative would have been much worse. If I did not kill 
him, the trucker would have suffered more and would not have gained  
anything. So if I were to find myself in such a situation, I would act partially 
out of empathy, as I would not want the trucker to suffer, and partially out 
of respect for his free will, because I would want to comply with his wish. 
 I assume that most people would feel and think in a similar—if not the 
same—way. There are only two options: either the friend shoots the driver 
dead or he does not do anything. But his not doing anything is clearly worse 
for the driver, because he will needlessly suffer if he is not shot dead. On 
the other hand, even though shooting the driver would be tragic, it would 
still be preferable to letting him burn to death. Therefore, I do not think 
that any convincing objections can be raised against shooting the lorry 
driver dead. 
 Consequently, I firmly believe that shooting the driver dead in order to 
spare him a painful death is permissible. Nevertheless, an anonymous re-
viewer remarked that the argument I am about to present is unconvincing, 
since the first premise is unjustified. I have to admit that this is true; I pro-
vided no justification for it, as I cannot prove it and cannot support it with 
any further arguments. But I have so much certainty in it that if someone 
expressed disagreement or doubt in relation to it, I would have to ask them 
for an explanation. In other words, what reason could one have to think 
that shooting the driver dead is not permissible? 
 There are several objections we would normally raise against shooting 
someone dead. Shooting the driver dead could be wrong because (1) it is 
against his will; (2) deprives him of all the good things he might have ex-
perienced if he lived; (3) harms him; or because (4) it violates his right to 
life.  
 We can quickly determine that these four initial objections do not apply 
in the lorry driver’s case. First, the lorry driver wanted to die. Second, even 
though it would be true for the majority of people that their death would 
deprive them of all the good they could have experienced if they stayed 
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alive, it is not true for the lorry driver, as nothing good awaited him. Third, 
it is true that killing a human being harms them in a way, since death 
typically implies bodily damage of some kind. However, we often choose 
to endure great bodily harm if it is in our interest. For example, we endure 
it during a common medical intervention, or, to mention an extreme case, 
as Aron Ralston endured it when he amputated his forearm with a pock-
etknife in order to save his life. Fourth, without any doubts, the right to 
life is one of the most fundamental moral principles we have. Still, we are 
able to renounce our rights. The lorry driver, just like a patient requesting 
euthanasia, had a right to life, but he renounced it because it was in his 
interest. 
 If any objections were raised against the argument I advance, I suspect 
that the first premise would be more likely to provoke them; therefore, 
I presume it needs more support. 
 One further objection could be that the friend should not shoot the 
driver dead, because there is always some alternative. In the trapped lorry 
driver’s case, it is only ex hypothesi true that he cannot be saved. But in 
real life we will not have this certainty and there will always be a chance, 
however small, that the driver could be saved. 
 Although our intuitions may betray us in some thought experiments, 
I do not think this is the case now. The original version of the trapped lorry 
driver case, as described by R.M. Hare (1975) and pointed out by Tomáš 
Hříbek (2010), illustrates this well. Rather than being a hypothetical case, 
it describes a situation that actually happened, very similar to the one de-
scribed above, and which was reported by the press at the time (the lorry 
driver was probably killed in the end). Instead of pondering on what we 
would do in a fabricated thought experiment, we can ask ourselves how we 
would behave if we found ourselves in such a situation, surrounded by all 
its uncertainties. However small, there is always a chance that the driver 
can be saved. But if this chance is minimal, it would be more reasonable 
not to risk the much more obvious possibility of the trucker burning to 
death coming true. 
 A patient requesting euthanasia is in a similar situation to the driver of 
the blazing lorry. Although he may not have any epistemic certainty of the 
accuracy of his prognosis, the evidence at hand and the medical knowledge 
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may yield enough practical certainty for him to make up his mind. (To read 
more about this type of objection, see Greif 2018). 
 Still another objection might be that shooting the driver dead is wrong 
because killing an innocent person is always wrong, regardless of the conse-
quences. Given that the driver is innocent, it is wrong to kill him.  
 It is very difficult to deny that killing an innocent person is wrong. After 
all, it is one of the most fundamental moral convictions. For example, killing 
a random passer-by is without any doubt a heinous act. In spite of this, 
I still maintain that killing an innocent person differs from committing 
a morally prohibited killing, i.e., murder. I think the rule “killing an inno-
cent person is wrong” is usually sufficient for us to understand what makes 
killing a person wrong; however, I do find it imprecise, as I believe that the 
trapped lorry driver’s case presents a perfect counter-example. Should we 
refuse to shoot the driver because of his innocence?3 What does the driver’s 
innocence or guiltiness have to do with the moral evaluation of his case? 
 I tried to show that it is morally permissible to shoot the lorry driver 
dead. If this judgement is right, then the rule that “killing an innocent 
person is wrong” cannot always be correct, as the lorry driver was also 
innocent. However, since this a rather intuitive argument, it should be ac-
companied with an explanation of why the rule is incorrect despite its un-
deniable appeal. In order to find it, I think we have to think about the 
purpose of guilt. 
 Why is it sometimes permissible to kill a guilty person but not an inno-
cent one? It seems that the moment an attacker assaults someone, they 
temporarily lose some of their rights as we stop taking their interests into 
full consideration. It seems that by endangering someone else’s life, for in-
stance, they can lose some of their rights, and their guiltiness gives us 
a moral right to treat them differently than we normally would. When 
someone commits a greater crime—say, threatens the life of an adult or 
a child—it might give us the right to take their life in self-defence. However, 
a patient requesting euthanasia has not committed any crime. We have no 
                                                 
3  One could even argue that killing the lorry driver is not only morally permissible 
but also obligatory; if we could comply with the trucker’s request but failed to do 
so, we would allow needless suffering to take place. However, I will not be defending 
this opinion here. 
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reason to treat them any differently than anyone else. Therefore, we should 
neither deny them their rights nor ignore their will.  
 By analysing the purpose of guilt, we can explain why the rule of “killing 
an innocent person is wrong” should be considered imprecise despite its 
intuitiveness. In almost every case when an innocent person is killed, we are 
entitled to think that a morally prohibited killing—that is, murder—oc-
curred. We have a good reason to think so, because the only good argument 
in favour of the opposite—that the “victim” wanted to die and the killing 
was merciful—typically does not apply. It is rare that outside of the context 
of medicine or war perhaps a person was killed because he or she actually 
wanted to die and being killed was good for them. 
 Finally, some might argue that it is wrong to shoot the driver dead 
because his life has an intrinsic and impersonal value, that some would call 
sanctity (Dworkin 1993), and it is wrong to sacrifice it for the quality of 
one’s life or for any other value. Since the value of life itself is impersonal, 
it is wrong to end driver’s life, even though it is no longer valuable for him 
or anyone else. 
 There is surely much to be said about this view, but I would like to 
propose a somewhat minimalistic refutation. To start, I think we should ask 
the following question; “Is the value of life itself absolute?” In other words, 
does the intrinsic value of life always come before other values or only in 
some cases? Let us consider both options, one by one.  
 If the intrinsic value of life always comes before other values, then no 
value can ever be more important. Compared with any other value, the 
intrinsic value of life would have an absolute worth. If those proclaiming 
that “every human life is sacred” accepted this option, it would presumably 
lead to some consequences that would be difficult to accept. Steven Luper 
illustrated these outcomes by means of the following thought experiments: 
Two Spells 
I know how to cast two magical spells. One of them, which 
Mary wants me to use on her, would ensure that she has a life 
that is extremely good and far better than the life she other-
wise would have had, but the spell will also kill her painlessly 
in her sleep one day sooner than the day she otherwise would 
have died of old age. The other spell, which she has forbidden 
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me to use, would not kill her but would ensure that she has 
a life that is wretched, and far worse than the life she other-
wise would have had. (Luper 2009, 186) 
 The first spell would shorten Mary’s life by one day; in exchange, it 
would ensure that the rest of her life would be extremely good. If we ac-
cepted the view that human life has an intrinsic value that can never be 
sacrificed for any other value, then casting the first spell would be wrong, 
as Mary’s life would be sacrificed for her quality of life. In addition, it would 
be morally more wrong to apply the first spell than the second one. How-
ever, we would probably disagree with these judgements. Besides being ben-
eficial for Mary, the first spell is perfectly moral and in fact more moral 
than the second one. Therefore, the view that human life has intrinsic value 
has some hard to accept consequences. 
 Let us now consider Luper’s second thought experiment: 
Unintentional Suicide 
I have an illness that will kill me within a week if allowed to 
progress. There is a treatment that will extend my life by one 
more year, but I will be in pain nearly the entire time. I weigh 
the extra time against the pain involved and decide to refuse 
the treatment. I die three days later. (Luper 2009, 187) 
 In this case, I sacrificed a longer life in favour of avoiding pain. If life 
has absolute intrinsic value, then this would be an immoral act as it is more 
valuable to live longer than to avoid pain. However, this is not how we 
think. Refusing treatment is a perfectly rational and moral decision. 
 If we believe that the intrinsic value of life always comes before other 
values, it leads to certain consequences that we are reluctant to accept. This 
is why I do not think that we should accept the strong version of the prin-
ciple that every human life has intrinsic value.  
 Let us consider the second, weaker version of the principle, according to 
which the intrinsic value of life only comes before other values in some 
cases. If the intrinsic value of life only comes first in certain situations, 
then sometimes are other values, such as the quality of life or personal 
dignity, more important. So when a patient requests euthanasia, how do 
we know whether these values did not outweigh the value of their life being 
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intrinsically valuable? Considering the Luper’s thought experiments, it 
seems fairly common that the considerations of quality of one’s life or of 
one’s dignity are more important that the intrinsic value of life. 
 Premise 2: If the friend killed the lorry driver, it would be a case of 
requested euthanasia, as the driver would die for his own good and on his 
own request. My second premise is that shooting the lorry driver is analo-
gous to physician-assisted requested euthanasia. When calling it euthanasia, 
it does not matter who performs it; the only fact that counts is that person 
A kills person B for person B’s benefit and on person B’s request. These 
conditions are met in the trapped lorry driver’s case. We can furthermore 
assert that the friend would shoot the driver dead with the intention of 
helping his friend and complying with his wish rather than taking revenge 
on him or wanting to put an end to his annoying screams. 
 So when a physician administers the lethal shot to a patient, for the 
patient’s benefit, on the patient’s request, and motivated by a good inten-
tion, his act is considered right because he does what the friend would do 
to the trapped lorry driver by shooting him dead. Thus, the argument goes 
as follows: 
Argument from analogy 
P1 Shooting the driver is morally permissible. 
P2 Shooting the driver is analogous to physician-assisted re-
quested euthanasia (assuming that the physician per-
forms the act with good intention). 
———————————————————————————— 
C Physician-assisted requested medical euthanasia is pre-
sumed to be morally permissible (assuming that the phy-
sician performs the act with good intention). 
 Any rejection of the second premise implies that there is a difference 
between the two instances of killing. This is true; we could surely find plenty 
of differences between killing the driver of a blazing lorry and killing a par-
ticular patient. However, not all of these differences are relevant. For ex-
ample, in the trapped lorry driver’s case, there is the immediate and unde-
niable danger of terrible suffering. As far as patients are concerned, the 
majority of cases will probably be different, since the reason why they want 
to die might not be as immediate or obvious. Despite this, the danger of 
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terrible suffering or loss of dignity, which are neither as immediate nor  
evident, is not any less real. If we accept this, we should see no significant 
difference between them. 
 Therefore, we should focus only on the differences that bear a moral 
relevance. Thus, those criticising the second premise should identify a mor-
ally relevant feature, F, which is present in one case but missing from the 
other. In order to provide support for the second premise, I consider two 
possible candidates for F; terminal illness or mortal danger and physical 
suffering. (To get an overview of classic legal conditions for candidacy for 
euthanasia, see Young 2019.)4 
 In the case of the blazing lorry, the driver found himself in mortal danger 
and the likelihood of him having to endure great physical suffering was very 
high. Should we thus presume that physician-assisted euthanasia is only per-
missible in cases when the patient’s life is in danger (or when they suffer from 
a terminal illness) and only when their suffering is of a physical nature? I do 
not think that the morality of euthanasia should depend on whether there is 
terminal illness, mortal danger, or physical suffering involved. 
 Where terminal illness and mortal danger are concerned, there are pa-
tients whose incurable diseases put them through intense agony, and they 
wish to die even though their illness is not life-threatening. These patients 
suffer greatly and can reasonably conclude that their lives are not worth 
living. Why should we consider the fact that they are not terminally ill to 
be morally relevant? 
 One of the reasons why the insistence on conditions such as terminal 
illness or mortal danger might seem necessary is because there is a possibil-
ity that the patient’s condition might improve in the future—for instance, 
with the invention of a new revolutionary cure or as a consequence of un-
expected remission. I believe that in particular cases, these factors should 
be taken into account when evaluating the rationality of euthanasia. How-
ever, they should not be regarded as an obstacle to performing euthanasia 
on non-terminally ill patients or people not finding themselves in mortal 
danger. The reason behind this is that if a patient is neither terminally ill 
                                                 
4  Naturally, someone might always point out a morally relevant feature that dif-
ferentiates requested euthanasia from the trapped lorry driver’s case. If an important 
difference has escaped my attention, I would like to be informed about it. 
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nor in mortal danger, but their life is still not worth living, more suffering 
could be avoided with euthanasia, since without it they are likely to live 
longer and suffer even more. If we imagined, per impossibile, that the lorry 
driver would not be burning alive for several minutes but for days, months, 
or even years, we would have all the more reason to spare him this suffering. 
Nevertheless, if we or our patient had a good reason to believe that there is 
a realistic chance of improving his or her situation, I do not think we should 
comply with his or her request for euthanasia. However, we can come to 
understand with a reasonable amount of certainty that some patients do 
not have a realistic chance. 
 The next condition relates to intolerable physical pain, which is put in 
direct contrast with mental or psychological pain. As far as I can see, we 
should not differentiate between these types of suffering where euthanasia 
is concerned, as psychological suffering is not any less real or unpleasant 
than physical one. Despite this, I maintain that when patients suffering 
from psychological pain rather than physical pain request euthanasia, we 
should deliberate their petition with much more care. 
 I suppose that the insistence on the condition of physical pain is similar 
to the previous one. It is more difficult to assess whether a patient’s life has 
ceased or will cease to be worth living if they suffer from psychological pain 
than if they experienced physical pain; the former is much more elusive. 
I find this to be a good reason for regulating euthanasia more strictly when 
it comes to patients afflicted with psychological pain; however, this does 
not mean that euthanasia should be denied to them. Some people suffer 
from incurable and unbearable psychological pain and their psychological 
condition renders their lives not worth living. If we cannot help them in any 
way and we have no reason to believe that we will be able to help them in 
the future, we might consider complying with their request. 
 I do not mean to suggest that patients should be given euthanasia with-
out trying to help them first. On the contrary; everyone requesting eutha-
nasia should be offered help, whether in the form of psychiatric therapy, 
palliative care, or some kind of experimental treatment. What I am sug-
gesting is that those not in mortal danger or whose suffering is mainly of 
a psychological nature should be presented with stricter legal conditions 
when requesting euthanasia. 
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 Although I consider these arguments convincing, others might not. It is 
also likely that some of my claims might prove to be untrue or unacceptable. 
If I am mistaken, I would like to be informed on the fallacies in my thinking, 
which I presume there will be; even in our provenience many objections 
have been raised against the position I am trying to defend. In the next 
part of this study, I will try to explain why my opinion on euthanasia has 
not been changed by them. 
* * * 
 Objection 1: The right to die is beyond the limits of the freedom of an 
individual. Death is something humans have no moral right to decide about. 
Since euthanasia involves one person killing another, it is not permissible. 
 Response: Saying that one’s right to die violates the (moral) limits of 
personal freedom does not seem right, since our society does not object when 
someone voluntarily puts their life in danger. We do not denounce people 
who risk their lives by becoming soldiers, police officers, fire-fighters, or 
stunt performers, nor do we condemn those putting their health in jeopardy 
with their lifestyle choices—say, by damaging their lungs by smoking or by 
pursuing extreme sports. This means that while a person is free to put their 
life at risk and lose it in the case of an accident, or consciously shorten and 
endanger it with the lifestyle they lead, they are not free to end it directly. 
Would those who raise this objection morally condemn all activities whose 
pursuit puts a person’s life at risk or shortens it? 
 Our society accepts such behaviour, and there are even instances when 
a person voluntarily taking their life is thought to be highly commendable. 
For example, a soldier throwing himself on a grenade and saving his friends 
is not committing a morally deplorable act but a laudable one! The percep-
tion of a mother dying for her child is similar. 
 An opponent of euthanasia might suggest that when someone requests 
the termination of their life, they do not sacrifice themselves to save another 
person’s life—they do so for their own well-being. However, I do not find 
this objection convincing enough. We could assume that the soldier’s sacri-
fice did not save his friends’ lives but “merely” spared them years of terrible 
torture. We could similarly imagine that the mother did not sacrifice herself 
to save her child’s life but to stop it from being brutally tormented. I suppose 
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most of us would not accuse these people of doing anything wrong. If we 
were to morally evaluate their sacrifice, we would be more likely to consider 
it laudable. 
 Jakub Jirsa (2011, 587) wrote in his paper that “my life is something 
I do not have right to do with as I see fit,”5 hence ending a life prematurely 
is morally problematic. I assume Jirsa is talking about a moral right rather 
than a legal one. I will furthermore assume that breaking a moral right 
means doing something wrong. If that is so, then Jirsa’s sentence suggests 
that ending or trying to end one’s life is not permissible. If he were right, 
it would mean that neither suicide and physician-assisted suicide nor re-
quested euthanasia were permissible, since they involve either ending one’s 
life or an attempt to do so. 
 In my interpretation, Jirsa offers two different arguments to support his 
claim about the limits of a person’s moral freedom. Let us start by consid-
ering the first one, which is based on the assumption that “I am permitted 
to do what I see fit only with what is (or could theoretically be) entirely 
within my control” (Jirsa 2011, 588). The author complements this conten-
tion by saying that one’s own life is not something one entirely controls. 
Thus: 
Jirsa’s first argument 
P1 My life is not and theoretically could not be entirely 
within my control. 
P2  I am morally permitted to do as I see fit only with what 
is or theoretically could be within my full control. 
———————————————————————————— 
C Therefore, I am not morally permitted to do with my 
own life as I see fit. 
 Let us look at the premises. What justifies the first premise? To support 
it, Jirsa is citing Galen Strawson, who argues that we cannot prove to be 
truly morally responsible for our actions. For the sake of concision, I re-
phrased Strawson’s argument as follows: 
                                                 
5  All translations from Czech are my own. 
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Strawson’s argument 
P1 “You do what you do because of the way you are.” 
P2 “To be truly morally responsible for what you do you 
must be truly responsible for the way you are—at least 
in certain crucial mental respects.” 
P3 “You cannot be truly responsible for the way you are, so 
you cannot be truly responsible for what you do.” 
P4 “To be truly responsible for the way you are, you must 
have intentionally brought it about that you are the way 
you are, and this is impossible.” (Strawson 1994, 13–14) 
P5 It is impossible to intentionally bring about who you are, 
because you must have existed before beginning to exist. 
———————————————————————————— 
C Thus, you are not morally responsible for what you do.  
 Strawson’s argument denies the existence of moral responsibility. If we 
accepted his contention, we would have to believe that it is not possible to 
be morally responsible for anything. Strawson himself clearly does not take 
this conclusion seriously; he presents it as a philosophical puzzle. His aim is 
to provoke a defensive reaction in philosophers so that they present a sat-
isfactory explanation for the nature of moral responsibility without resort-
ing to such absurdities, as there is no moral responsibility. 
 Jirsa’s first premise most likely seeks support in premises of Strawson’s 
argument. The way I am defines how I behave and decide. But since I have 
not intentionally brought about the way I am—as it is impossible—I cannot 
have any control over the way I am, and as a result I cannot have any 
control over what is defined by my nature—i.e., my behaviour and decision-
making. 
 However, if this is the reasoning behind Jirsa’s first premise, it means 
that we have no control over anything. No decision or act would be free. 
For the sake of argument, let us assume that Jirsa’s first premise is true. 
 Let us take a look at the justification the second premise depends upon. 
Jirsa claims (Jirsa 2011, 588) it to be his assumption. For the sake of argu-
ment, let us now presume it true. If we recognised this statement, we would 
not be morally permitted to do as we see fit with anything. Because by 
accepting the justification Jirsa provides for his first premise, we would also 
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have to acknowledge that we do not have full control over anything. But, 
as the second premise suggests, if having full control over X is the precon-
dition for doing with X as we see fit, then we do not have the moral per-
mission to do as we see fit with anything. 
 I would like to contradict this by saying that I am morally permitted to 
do as I see fit with my choice of words in this sentence. I find the implication 
that moral permission is impossible to be unacceptable. We should rather 
refuse Jirsa’s line of reasoning than accept such an implication. Neverthe-
less, if we carried on analysing Strawson’s puzzle, we would stray too far 
from our discussion on euthanasia. 
 Jirsa’s second argument is based on Wittgenstein’s thesis from his Trac-
tatus Logico-Philosophicus, declaring that “[d]eath is not an event in life 
but is the end of life” (qtd. in Jirsa 2011, 588). Jirsa’s conclusion was that 
ending or trying to end one’s life is not permissible. However, the claim 
that death is not an event in life but is the end of life does not imply that 
ending or trying to end one’s life is morally wrong. We thus need to com-
plement it with an additional premise. 
 I am not sure which one Jirsa would prefer, since he did not express it 
explicitly. I will assume that since Jirsa believes that death is not an event 
in life, and that therefore it is wrong to bring it about, than it is wrong to 
bring about everything that is not an event in life. Based on this premise, 
we can construct the following argument: 
Jirsa’s second argument 
P1 If X is not an event in life, then it is wrong to bring 
about X. 
P2 Death is not an event in life, it is the end of life. 
———————————————————————————— 
C Therefore, it is wrong to bring about death. 
 If this is Jirsa’s second argument, then I do not find it convincing. If 
a person cannot decide on the death of another person because death is not 
an event in the life of the person to be killed but is the end of it, then, for 
the same reason, they cannot decide about the beginning of life. Conception 
is also not an event in the life of the conceived—it is the beginning of it. 
Physicians would thus not be permitted to provide assistance not only in 
death, but in birth as well. 
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 My last objection against Jirsa’s position is independent of the argument 
provided for its support. If the position was true or acceptable, then shoot-
ing the trapped lorry driver, together with the soldier’s and mother’s sacri-
fice, would be wrong. Should we accept this conclusion? I do not think so. 
This is why I believe Jirsa’s arguments should not be accepted. However, it 
is possible that I misinterpreted or misunderstood his resoning. 
 Objection 2: Euthanasia should be prohibited as it would lead to a slip-
pery slope. If we started practising it, it would eventually result in involun-
tary euthanasia or even medical murder. 
 Response: The slippery slope objection fundamentally differs from the 
previously proposed arguments. Although it claims that we should not be 
practising euthanasia, it does not say that euthanasia itself is wrong. What 
it deems morally wrong are the side effects of practising and legalising eu-
thanasia. Euthanasia is thus indirectly wrong. 
 Those against the legalisation of euthanasia maintain that we would find 
ourselves on a slippery slope that would eventually lead to involuntary eu-
thanasia and medical murder. These critics worry that by legalising re-
quested euthanasia, sooner or later we would due to sociological, psycho-
logical, or even logical reasons end up emulating practices of Nazi Germany. 
They worry that if euthanasia became an option, it would eventually turn 
into an expectation or even a requirement.  
 I presume that we would not like to live in a society that required or 
even forced some of its members to undergo premature and unwanted death; 
I know I would not. How then can I advocate for the legalisation of re-
quested euthanasia?6 Marta Munzarová (2012, 416) described the situation 
in the Netherlands in the following way: “Killing patients without their 
request is still happening, but the reporting must be different (since it is 
not euthanasia, which is defined by Dutch law as killing ‘on the patient’s 
request’). Can we imagine a more illustrative example of a slippery slope?”  
 I support the legalisation of euthanasia because I do not believe it would 
lead us down a slippery slope. Firstly, advocating for requested euthanasia 
                                                 
6  I support the right to euthanasia in the sense that a patient should have the 
option to receive euthanasia, but I do not support it in the sense that a physician 
should be obliged to administer it to them. 
18  Adam Greif 
Organon F 2019: 1–23 
and rejecting involuntary euthanasia is not contradictory. The distinction 
between them is clear. The cases Munzarová mentions show how patients’ 
lives were terminated without their explicit request. The authors of the 
study claim that these were predominantly patients who were unable to 
express their will because, for instance, they were in a coma. These were 
instances of so-called non-voluntary euthanasia,7 usually performed on pa-
tients who were incapable of giving voice to their decisions; thus, these 
patients did not die against their will. 
 I suppose Munzarová is trying to point out that the medical records 
relating to the termination of lives contain a category of patients who did 
not explicitly consent to being killed. This fact in itself does not prove that 
there is a slippery slope; only long-term statistics could confirm that, as 
one-year data do not adequately illustrate how many cases of euthanasia 
without the explicit consent of the patient were performed in previous years. 
We should compare records of several years and see if they indicate a growth 
in deaths we consider wrong. Moreover, we also do not know how many 
instances recorded in the category of “a patient’s life ended without their 
explicit consent” occurred in countries that still see euthanasia as murder 
but find terminal sedation acceptable (like Slovakia, for example), since we 
do not keep a record of them. As a result, we do not know if a system that 
has legalised euthanasia is better or worse in this aspect than a system 
where it is illegal. 
 But let us get back to the key question. Is there any evidence to support 
the contention that in the Netherlands, instances of unacceptable—or less 
acceptable—forms of ending lives are on the rise? A Dutch study conducted 
in 2010 (Onwuteaka-Philipsen et al. 2012, 912) indicated a decline in the 
frequency of cases where lives were terminated without the explicit consent 
of the patient, while a meta-analysis of Dutch studies (Rietjens et al. 2009, 
279) concluded that “the legalization of euthanasia in the Netherlands did 
not result in a slippery slope for medical end-of-life practices.” Therefore, 
                                                 
7  There is a difference between involuntary and non-voluntary euthanasia. In the 
case of involuntary euthanasia, the patient does not want to die, or they can express 
their will but it is being ignored. In the case of non-voluntary euthanasia, the patient 
is unable to communicate what they want. 
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there is no evidence to support the claim that the Dutch euthanasia prac-
tices are on a slippery slope. 
 In addition, I would not like to brush off Munzarová’s suggestion that 
non-voluntary euthanasia is inherently morally wrong—if that is indeed 
what she suggests. I believe that there are situations—especially those in-
volving people who will never regain consciousness—where non-voluntary 
euthanasia should be permitted. However, I will have to defend that thesis 
on another occasion. 
 Finally, if we eventually found out that in spite of what current records 
indicate, the legalisation of euthanasia would lead our society to a slippery 
slope, we can always change the law and reinstate the former system. So 
even if legalising euthanasia proved to be a mistake, we would not be obliged 
to continue with it forever. Therefore, I do not think there is a reason for 
us to worry about finding ourselves on a slippery slope. 
 There is, however, one additional argument, somewhat close to the slip-
pery slope idea. One could argue that legalising euthanasia would be harm-
ful even if no one was forced to undergo it, because it would necessarily 
present the population with an uncomfortable choice. The mere fact that 
one is presented with a choice between continued life and euthanasia could 
exert, in some segments of the population, a measure of psychological pres-
sure and therefore cause suffering. I believe this reasoning is close to Jirsa’s 
line of argument, since he has voiced his opinion that legalising euthanasia 
would exert pressure on patients that are the most vulnerable and disad-
vantaged (Jirsa 2011, 589). 
 In response, I would like to say, somewhat vaguely, that it is far from 
clear that the value gained by avoiding suffering caused by the pressure of 
choice is greater than the value gained by avoiding suffering of euthanasia 
applicants. I personally doubt it is. Although I have no evidence for this 
claim, I presume that the proponents of this argument would agree with me 
that this argument, just like the slippery slope argument, should be based 
on empirical evidence.  
 Objection 3: Euthanasia should not be practised as there is no need for 
it. What renders it needless is the efficiency of palliative and hospice care, 
along with the fact that patients may refuse nutrition and hydration and 
will thus die without any assistance. 
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 Response: Some claim that there is no need for euthanasia because pal-
liative and hospice care have improved so much that they can significantly 
reduce the patients’ suffering. Marek Vácha (2010, 273) maintains that 
“palliative care has advanced so much that when a patient has been suffer-
ing from unbearable physical pain for a long time, he is most likely receiving 
the wrong treatment.” Jirsa seconds this opinion, as does Munzarová (Jirsa 
2011, 581; Munzarová 2012, 416). 
 This objection differs from the previous two as it refrains from calling 
euthanasia directly or indirectly wrong and merely attempts to prove its 
needlessness;8 therefore, it does not challenge my thesis about requested 
euthanasia being morally permissible. Despite this, I would still like to ad-
dress this objection, as it has been presented by several authors. 
 I do not mean to imply that there is anything wrong about palliative or 
hospice care. I do believe that it is important for people whose quality of 
life is expected to decline to avail themselves of such avenues of treatment 
if they want to. We should fully support those who make use of such treat-
ments rather than wishing to die, as every potentially helpful option should 
be examined and tried. This is why I would prefer it if palliative care re-
ceived wider recognition. 
 However, it is up to the patient to ultimately decide if they find pallia-
tive care useful; they can judge for themselves whether it makes their life 
worth living or not. After all, it might not; contrary to Vácha’s view, noth-
ing guarantees that palliative care will render their lives more liveable (un-
less my opponents can prove that it is 100% effective). Even if palliative 
care could relieve a patient of their pain, it might come at a higher cost 
than the patient is willing to pay. By the time the physician successfully 
identifies a pain management method that would suit a particular patient’s 
needs, it is possible that the patient will have had to suffer through 
a lengthy period of trial and error during which their pain will not be alle-
viated and their quality of life will not improve. And even if the physician 
found a suitable treatment, the patient might spend the rest of their life 
experiencing nausea, incontinence, frequent losses of consciousness or other 
                                                 
8  This objection is more pertinent to debates disputing the rationality of euthana-
sia rather than its morality; however, I decided to include it, as it is normally pre-
sented as a moral reproach. 
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distressing symptoms. If a patient decides that they do not want to receive 
palliative care at such a cost and refuses to spend their remaining days with 
such poor quality of life, they might want to die with medical assistance. 
This is supported by studies of patients who have been presented with 
a choice between high standard palliative care and a physician-hastened 
death and who preferred or would prefer the latter (Wilson et al. 2007; Quill 
et al. 2008). 
 This objection differs from the others in one further aspect. Rather than 
attacking the permissibility of euthanasia, it challenges its legalisation. I do 
not mean to claim that if something is morally permissible then it must also 
be legal. However, I do think that if an act is morally permitted then the 
most fundamental objection against its legalisation loses its ground. Those 
opposing the legalisation of euthanasia carry the burden of proof in showing 
that as a society, we should legally prohibit something that is morally per-
mitted. I believe that Jirsa’s remaining objections could be solved if eutha-
nasia was properly regulated, as no supporter of sound mind would want to 
legalise euthanasia without taking proper regulatory measures.  
 Legalisation and morality are two different things and I fully agree with 
Jirsa (2011, 586) that we should not lose sight of what sets them apart. 
I think that in some countries, legalising euthanasia might cause more harm 
than good. Similarly to Jirsa and several other participants of the euthana-
sia discussion in Slovakia, I worry that legalising euthanasia under the cir-
cumstances that currently prevail in the country would be rather harmful, 
although I do not know it with certainty. I do not know if legalising eutha-
nasia would ultimately have a negative impact on our society, as scientific 
evidence is needed to get a well-founded answer to this question.9 To the 
best of my knowledge, there is no evidence for any of these sides, which is 
why I refuse to take a stand in this discussion. But even if we accepted that 
                                                 
9  If I may venture a speculation, the experience so far suggests that physician-
assisted death and euthanasia are generally being implemented by developed coun-
tries with high healthcare standards (Physician-assisted death: Switzerland, Oregon, 
Washington, Montana, Vermont, Canada, and soon Australia; Euthanasia: The 
Netherlands, Belgium, Luxembourg, and Colombia). This might signify that imple-
menting such end-of-life practices in countries with less developed health care sys-
tems could lead to adverse consequences. 
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in the current state of affairs euthanasia would be harmful, conditions might 
improve in the future, which might present the right circumstances for le-
galising euthanasia. Besides, if we believe that euthanasia is morally per-
mitted and should be legally accessible, we should take active means to 
bring about such a future. 
* * * 
 Summa summarum, I think that from a moral point of view, the re-
quested euthanasia of adults is permissible, because I accept the argument 
from analogy, and because I am not aware of any good objection against its 
permissibility. Where the legal aspect is concerned, I differentiate between 
immediate legalisation and legalisation when the time is right. Since I do 
not know if the current conditions in Slovakia or in other states are appro-
priate for legalisation, I take the position that euthanasia should be legalised 
once the conditions are ripe for it. In a nutshell, euthanasia should be le-
gal—if not at this moment, then sometime in the future. But even if eutha-
nasia should be legal sometime in the future, we should take proactive steps 
to create suitable conditions for its implementation. 
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